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Abstract: Th e historic material culture
produced by American Cold War nu-
clear weapons testing includes objects of 
scientifi c inquiry that can be generally 
categorized as being either ephemeral or 
enduring. Objects deemed to be ephem-
eral were of a  less substantial nature,
being impermanent and expendable in
a  nuclear test, while enduring objects
were by nature more durable and long-
lasting. Although all of these objects were
ultimately subject to disappearance, the
processes by which they were trans-
formed, degraded, or destroyed prior to
their disappearing diff er. Drawing prin-
cipally upon archaeological theory, this
paper proposes a  functional dichotomy 
for categorizing and studying the his-
torical trajectories of nuclear weapons
testing technoscience artifacts. In ex-
amining the transformation patterns of 
steel towers and concrete blockhouses in
particular, it explores an associated loss
of scientifi c method that accompanies
a science object’s disappearance.
Keywords: Cold War; Bikini Atoll; 
bunkers; nuclear weapons testing; zero 
towers
Efemérní a trvalé: trajektorie 
zániku vědeckých předmětů 
amerického testování jaderných 
zbraní
Abstrakt: Historická materiální kul-
tura, která je výsledkem amerického 
testování jaderných zbraní za  studené 
války, zahrnuje objekty vědeckého vý-
zkumu, jež lze obecně kategorizovat 
jako efemérní nebo trvalé. Objekty 
považované za  efemérní měly méně 
solidní podstatu, jelikož byly pomíjivé 
a určené ke zničení při jaderném testu, 
zatímco trvalé objekty byly z  podstaty 
odolné a dlouhotrvající. Ačkoli všechny 
tyto objekty nakonec podlehly zkáze, 
procesy, jež jejich zániku předcházely 
a  jimiž byly objekty transformovány, 
degradovány nebo ničeny, se lišily. Tento 
text čerpá především z  archeologické 
teorie a  navrhuje funkční dichotomii 
pro kategorizaci a výzkum historických 
trajektorií technovědeckých artefaktů 
určených k  testování jaderných zbraní. 
Zkoumáním zejména transformačních 
vzorců ocelových věží a  betonových 
pevností se tento text zabývá související 
ztrátou vědecké metody, která dopro-
vází zánik vědeckého objektu.
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Introduction
In the Republic of the Marshall Islands, on the Bikini Atoll island of 
Airukiraru, a relic of American Cold War nuclear weapons testing stands 
precariously on the lagoon shoreline. Built in early 1954 for use in Opera-
tion Castle, the concrete blockhouse dubbed Station 2300 (Figure 1) avoided 
immediate nuclear destruction multiple times by virtue of its virtual in-
destructibility. Yet over the past sixty years, the erosional actions of wind, 
waves, and tide have moved the Airukiraru shoreline more than 100 meters 
inland threatening to do what the most destructive forces ever wielded by 
mankind could not: reduce it to rubble. When the end comes for Station 
2300, fewer than a dozen nuclear weapons testing blockhouses will remain 
on Bikini Atoll’s historic Cold War landscape.
Figure 1: Scientifi c Station 2300 at the Bikini Atoll lagoon’s edge in 2009.
Source: Photo courtesy of Steve Brown.
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The Ephemeral and the Enduring
Th e slow decay and disappearance of Scientifi c Station 2300 will be the 
last phase in a trajectory that is uncommon to most epistemological objects 
of modern science. Its demise is uncommon in the sense that it presents 
a unique situation in which the object was used scientifi cally for only a brief 
period of time before being abandoned and left  to degrade and disappear. 
As a consequence of the station’s formidable concrete construction, the fi nal 
phase of the structure’s existence will be a slow and gradual degradation, de-
formation, and disappearance. Th is is very unlike other substantial objects 
of twentieth-century physics, such as astronomical telescopes and particle 
accelerators, which typically serve their original purposes for lengthy peri-
ods of time and oft en only out of obsolescence are either decommissioned or 
repurposed to further prolong their use in scientifi c research.
Drawing upon archaeological and material culture studies theory, this 
paper examines some of the transformations and deformations that the 
steel instrument towers and reinforced concrete blockhouses of American 
Cold War nuclear weapons testing science follow in trajectories toward 
their ultimate disappearance. Th e objects of Cold War nuclear weapons 
science discussed here are “epistemic” in that they are structures and tools 
of scientifi c inquiry that are distinctly separate from the objects of nuclear 
weapons science, which are the nuclear devices themselves. Th is focus upon 
the trajectories of epistemic nuclear weapons testing objects is intentionally 
neoteric in light of the fact that history of science studies has traditionally 
focused more upon the origins and employments of scientifi c objects than on 
their decay and disappearance. Th at said, it seems important to note that the 
notion of disappearance in this particular context does not necessarily de-
note an immediate and complete passing from physical existence, although 
in many nuclear weapons testing instances this is the case. Here the term is 
intended to connote the abandonment, extinction, or other loss of an object 
from use in scientifi c processes and practices. For example, in the case of the 
Station 2300 blockhouse, its eroding concrete ruins will likely be recogniz-
able as such for decades, if not hundreds, of years, while in all practical and 
political senses its use in nuclear weapons testing has long ended. Disused 
and abandoned, the object has metaphorically “disappeared”, both from 
the global scientifi c landscape and current work of nuclear physics. And 
although this paper engages specifi cally with several of the epistemologi-
cal structures used in aboveground experiments, dubbed AGEX by its Cold 
War practitioners, used in American nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and 
Enewetak atolls (known collectively as the Pacifi c Proving Grounds, or PPG) 
and the Nevada Test Site in the United States, the functional dichotomy and 
282
trajectories proposed here likely apply to all scientifi c objects of nuclear 
weapons testing, including those used historically and at the present time by 
other nations engaged in nuclear weapons testing.
A Functional Dichotomy
As simplistic as it may initially appear, partitioning the scientifi c objects 
that comprise the entire materiality of Cold War nuclear weapons testing 
as a  dichotomy is actually a  promising functional approach to exploring 
and understanding the trajectories of their disappearance. Objects of a less 
substantial nature – impermanent and generally expendable – are generally 
ephemeral, whereas artifacts regarded as enduring are by their very nature 
exceptionally robust, durable, and persistent. With these two subsets of 
objects being both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, with no object 
belonging simultaneously to both subsets, and with all objects of nuclear 
weapons testing science belonging to one subset or the other, the dichotomy 
is valid, which provides a  thesis upon which to base comprehensive inter-
rogations of the tangible material culture of nuclear weapons testing science. 
Th is dichotomy is more than a rhetorical contrivance, as it is a convention 
loosely drawn from the way in which nuclear weapons scientists nomi-
nally defi ned the structures they built and used for testing as being either 
expendable or non-expendable.1 Employed as an epistemological tool, this
elemental dichotomy seems particularly promising in helping to more fully 
understand the complex transformations and trajectories of Cold War sci-
ence objects where comprehensive material culture interrogations of nuclear 
weapons testing science are still a relatively new, but growing, fi eld of schol-
arly activity within the social studies of science.
Distinctive in its aspirations to understand better the materiality of both 
the history and the culture of the era, the archaeology of Cold War science is 
capable of making substantive contributions to the study of historic and con-
temporary science.2 Studies of scientifi c experiments during the Operation 
1  See Completion Report – Operation Redwing 1954–1956. Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, Inc.
1956, pp. 2–151.
2  For more on this topic, see Colleen M. BECK, “Th e Archaeology of Scientifi c Experiments as 
a Nuclear Testing Ground.” In: SCHOFIELD, J. – JOHNSON, W. – BECK, C. (eds.), Matériel 
Culture: Th e Archaeology of Twentieth-Century Confl ict. London: Routledge 2002; Todd A. 
HANSON, Th e Archaeology of the Cold War. Gainesville: University Press of Florida 2016; 
Michael B. SCHIFFER, Th e Archaeology of Science: Studying the Creation of Useful Knowledge. 
Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing 2013.
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Crossroads atomic tests at Bikini Atoll was the fi rst archaeological research 
aimed at identifying the nature of the dichotomy between the enduring and 
the ephemeral in nuclear testing.3 At Bikini, a  collection of 95 American,
German, and Japanese naval ships were set up in the atoll’s lagoon in July 
1946 as targets for atomic weapons tests. Whereas American nuclear weap-
ons scientists were already somewhat knowledgeable of the atomic bomb’s 
destructive capabilities before Crossroads, based on conventional explosives 
detonations, the Trinity test, and the devastation recorded at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, the specifi cs of the nuclear blast eff ects were lesser known. In 
particular, the measurement of the extreme thermal, pressure, and radiation 
eff ects produced by nuclear weapons proved particularly daunting. Even at 
Crossroads, these data were diffi  cult to collect because the sparse laboratory 
instrumentation that existed to measure these eff ects was oft en of such a deli-
cate nature that it was highly unsuitable for rigorous fi eld use. As a result, 
rudimentary, but extremely durable, pressure measurement instrumentation 
became the principle method for quantifying some of the more elementary 
physics characteristics of nuclear blasts. In his studies of nuclear weapons 
eff ects blast metrology on Operation Crossroads shipwrecks, marine archae-
ologist Delgado points to pressure gauges recovered from the wreck of the 
USS Saratoga that were constructed of simple lead plates with small steel balls 
attached to their faces.4 Blast overpressures were approximated by measuring
the depth of the indentations made when the steel balls were pressed into 
these lead plates by the force of the atomic explosion.
Operation Crossroads and the nuclear weapons tests that followed it 
allowed scientists to delineate an ephemeral and enduring dichotomy for 
all scientifi c objects, including structures. Structures such as reinforced 
concrete blockhouses invariably fell within the class of enduring objects, 
whereas other objects of a more expendable nature, such as the steel tow-
ers, belonged to a class of ephemeral objects that also included the cameras, 
oscilloscopes, blast pressure recording devices, and radiation measurement 
instruments that were required for fi eld testing. Because these instruments 
were rarely designed or intended to be deployed in environments as hostile 
as a nuclear explosion, the most fragile of them would require improvements 
3 James P. DELGADO – Daniel J. LENIHAN – Larry E. MURPHY – Larry V. NORDBY – 
Jerry L. LIVINGSTON. Th e Archeology of the Atomic Bomb: A Submerged Cultural Resources 
Assessment of the Sunken Fleet of Operation Crossroads at Bikini and Kwajalein Atoll Lagoons. 
Santa Fe: National Park Service 1991.
4 James P. DELGADO, Ghost Fleet: Th e Sunken Ships of Bikini Atoll. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press 1996.
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in order to be used in nuclear weapons testing without being damaged or 
destroyed. If an increased robustness was impossible or impractical, the sen-
sitivity of the devices might be enhanced to allow them to operate at greater 
distances from the blast’s eff ects, out of harm’s way. Eventually, a dichotomy 
would emerge into which all objects of American Cold War nuclear weapons 
testing science could be considered either enduring or ephemeral.
Th e Enduring and Ephemeral in Nuclear Weapons Testing
Beyond the reinforced concrete blockhouses built at the PPG and Nevada 
Test Site, some of the other objects considered to be enduring within the pro-
posed dichotomy include massive cubes of solid concrete used to measure the 
physical force of a nuclear blast by their movement, concrete walls employed 
as collimators to channel neutron particles for detection and measurement, 
and concrete enclosures used to protect cameras from intense heat and ra-
diation during a nuclear explosion. While not essential to being enduring, 
the above examples derive much of their durability from being constructed 
of concrete, which also gave them substantial mass. Non-expendable objects 
Figure 2: Empty 5 gallon cans being stacked against a blockhouse wall on Enewetak 
Atoll prior to an Operation Sandstone nuclear test in 1948. Th e degree to which the 
cans were crushed by the extreme pressures created by the explosion provided data
on the blast’s magnitude.
Source: Photo courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
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were frequently built for repeated use, with consideration given to both their 
location and durability. Camera enclosures and blockhouses were sited in the 
PPG for use in recording several detonations of an operation and designed 
and constructed to withstand the maximum estimated blast overpressures 
of an entire test series.
Conversely, objects of Cold War nuclear weapons scientifi c inquiry that 
were deemed expendable included a wide array of sensors, detectors and re-
cording devices ranging from simple metal cans (as shown in Figure 2) that 
collapsed at extreme atmospheric pressures to more advanced instrumenta-
tion such as oscilloscopes, mass spectrographs, beta particle spectrographs, 
photocells and photomultipliers, and various types of particle detectors and 
ion chambers, which even now are rarely considered expendable in scientifi c 
research but were considered such in the practices of American Cold War 
nuclear weapons testing.5 Th e expendable scientifi c objects used in nuclear
weapons testing were generally small in size, but not necessarily fewer in 
number as redundancy and replication were common practices in tests 
where there was generally only one fl eeting opportunity to collect data. As 
a result, there was never only one detector, recording station, automobile, or 
other expendable scientifi c object placed intentionally in the experiment’s 
blast zone, but dozens or more. Exceptions to the generally smaller size of 
most expendable objects included the barges, towers, and even islands upon 
which the tests were staged and then routinely destroyed as a consequence 
of the test. Complicated by the fact that an object’s fi nancial cost appears to 
have only occasionally been a consideration in determining its expendable 
versus non-expendable nature, the rules for deciding what could be lost in 
a  blast and what survived seems to have been premised principally upon 
scientifi c objectives. Perhaps nowhere is the complex nature of this premise 
better exemplifi ed than in the steel towers and concrete blockhouses, which 
served as primary scientifi c objects on each side of the ephemeral/enduring 
dichotomy.
Steel Towers
Among the scientifi c structures used in Cold War nuclear weapons test-
ing, towers stood above all others in their importance, functionality, and 
expendability. Used to both situate the nuclear devices being tested and hold 
5 Chuck HANSEN, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Th e Secret History. New York: Orion Books 1988, 
p. 51.
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cameras and instrumentation recording the detonation, the towers served as 
critical tools of scientifi c inquiry.
Th e use of towers in nuclear weapons testing began with the test of the 
fi rst atomic bomb in July 1945 at a remote section of New Mexico’s Jornada 
del Muerto, which was known thereaft er as the Trinity Site. However, over 
the course of the Cold War test towers would be neither uniform nor ubiq-
uitous in their use, design, or height. During the period from 1946 to 1962, 
only 56 of the United States’ 206 aboveground nuclear weapons tests were 
staged on towers.6
Figure 3: July 1945: the atomic test tower at Trinity Site in New Mexico.
Source: Photo courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Ranging in height from 30 to 200 meters and consisting of columnar 
steel lattices topped with an enclosed instrumentation platform designed to 
house a nuclear device, “zero towers” were critically important to attaining 
the scientifi c objectives of testing as an apparatus for precisely positioning 
a  nuclear device at a  specifi c location and elevation.7 Zero towers varied 
6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, United States Nuclear Tests July 1945
through September 1992. DOE/NV-209-Rev.16. Las Vegas: National Nuclear Security 
Administration 2015, p. xiv.
7  Named for their location at ground zero, towers of this use type were also oft en referred to col-
loquially as “shot” towers. In the technical, scientifi c, and design literature and language of the 
testing era, however, the “zero tower” or “scientifi c station” nomenclatures were more common.
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somewhat in form or design over the course of AGEX testing, but evolved 
substantially in terms of height and load capacities due to advances in 
strengthening the towers’ lattices.8
Designed and erected by Holmes & Narver, Inc. (H&N), a Los Angeles 
engineering and construction fi rm hired by the United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission to construct almost all United States Cold War nuclear 
weapons testing structures at the Pacifi c Proving Grounds and the Nevada 
Test Site, the three or four-legged towers were fabricated with 6-meter-wide 
triangular or square cross sections in 7.62-meter lengths and shipped to 
ground zero for erection. Even with a  92-meter-high tower weighing as 
much as 45,000 kilos, towers could be erected in weeks, but construction 
was oft en intentionally halted aft er some initial groundwork to prevent 
possible damage to a  completed tower from other nuclear testing in the 
Figure 4: One of the zero towers used for Operation Teapot in 1955 at the Nevada
Test Site.
Source: Photo courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
8 HOLMES & NARVER, Completion Report – Operation Redwing. p. 45.
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vicinity. Stabilized by steel guy wires attached to the tower at 15-meter incre-
ments and moored to steel stanchions anchored to concrete blocks in the 
ground, the zero tower’s legs were set in a concrete foundation at its base. 
Th e cost of an average 100-meter-high steel zero tower, such as that shown 
in Figure 4, was US$ 275,000 in 1954 (or roughly $ 2.5 million in current 
US dollars).9 Early lattice towers were built to support only a few thousand 
kilos, which included the weight of the cab enclosure, the nuclear device and 
its fi ring hardware, and the dynamic weight loads of personnel working on 
the device in the cab. As weapons diagnostics techniques advanced and ad-
ditional electronics, instrumentation, and cooling equipment were required 
in the cab, both the sizes and load-bearing capacities of the cabs increased. 
And as cabs grew larger, stronger steel lattices were required to hold the 
additional weight. By the summer of Operation Redwing in 1956, American 
zero towers were capable of routinely accommodating loads up to 90 thou-
sand kilos.10 Meanwhile, hundreds of other types and sizes of steel towers 
were used extensively from 1946 to 1962, almost anytime an instrument, 
camera, or communication device needed to be positioned above ground 
level for a test. Th ese observation and photo towers rose above any surface 
obstructions that might be created by topography, vegetation, or other man-
made structures.
Atop every zero tower was a  weatherproof compartment built of cor-
rugated sheet aluminum, glass windows, and steel or aluminum decking. 
Th e cab, or “tower house” as it was occasionally called, not only provided 
personnel, devices, and instrumentation with protection from any extreme 
or inclement weather, but also helped keep secret the design, appearance, 
and operational aspects of the nuclear device prior to detonation. Th e 
roughly 7.5-meter by 7.5-meter fl oor area of the cab provided space for the 
device and its associated electronics and instrumentation, as well as working 
space for engineers and technicians. Winches built into the apex of the cab 
roof allowed equipment and the experimental nuclear devices to be lift ed 
from the ground. Elevators and ladders attached to the side of the towers, 
such as those shown in Figure 5, allowed for the movement of personnel and 
equipment up and down the tower.
As epistemic objects of American Cold War nuclear weapons testing sci-
ence, the purpose of zero towers was to hold the nuclear device at a specifi c 
9 Completion Report – Eniwetok Proving Ground Facilities, Vol. VIII Facilities and Stations. Los 
Angeles: Holmes & Narver, Inc. 1951, p. 142.
10 HOLMES & NARVER, Completion Report – Operation Redwing, p. 45.
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distance above ground level, but situating the exact point of detonation had 
both technical and political purposes. Th e technical purpose of the zero 
towers was to provide precisely known geographical and altitudinal coordi-
nates for the detonation point. Th ese coordinates were critically important 
in aiming both the cameras used for recording images of the detonation and 
instrumentation used for measuring the thermal, pressure, and radiation ef-
fects of the explosion. Both these cameras and some of the instrumentation 
were also mounted on steel towers.
Figure 5: A view of the zero tower used for Operation Plumbbob at the Nevada Test
Site in 1957 showing the elevator, access ladders and guy wires.
Source: Photo courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Th e political reasons for increasing zero tower heights were the result 
of the fact that when a nuclear device was detonated close to the ground, its 
fi reball picked up signifi cant amounts of soil and debris which, when fused 
with metals from the tower and weapon, became entrained in the explosion’s 
so-called mushroom cloud. Radioactive debris from this cloud, called fallout, 
posed deleterious environmental and health eff ects that in the nuclear testing 
era became of ever-increasing concern to the general public. As a result, every 
tower test performed aft er Trinity was increasingly higher off  the ground, 
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principally to help mitigate any radioactive fallout. Whereas the Trinity 
test had been fi red on a  30-meter-high tower (Figure 3), zero towers used 
for subsequent tests extended to 61 meters for Operation Sandstone in 1948, 
92 meters for Operation Greenhouse in 1951, and 153 meters for Operation 
Teapot by 1955 (See Figure 4). In 1957, the Operation Plumbbob Smoky shot 
used a 213-meter-high tower.11 Th e higher elevation of the nuclear device also 
meant its fi reball could be observed and measured at greater distances, which 
became increasingly necessary as weapon yields increased.
Concrete Blockhouses
As enduring as the towers were ephemeral, the concrete blockhouses used in 
nuclear weapons testing provided critical thermal, blast, and radiation pro-
tection for personnel, instrumentation, and data during and aft er the tests.12
Eponymously named for their block-like form, blockhouses containing from 
one to as many as nine rooms were built by the United States in relatively 
small numbers to support atmospheric nuclear weapons testing activities at 
Enewetak Atoll and Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands and at the Nevada 
Test Site. Structures of similar design and purpose were also built for nuclear 
weapons testing at Maralinga in Australia for British testing, at Mururoa 
Atoll in French Polynesia by the French, at Lop Nor in China, and in Ka-
zakhstan, as shown in Figure 6, at the former Soviet Union’s Semipalatinsk 
nuclear testing site.
All of the blockhouses used in American Cold War nuclear weapons 
testing operations were designed and built by Holmes & Narver, Inc. From 
1950–1958, H&N built more than 50 reinforced concrete blockhouses for 
use as scientifi c stations at the PPG. Th e largest and most robust of these 
were constructed at Bikini Atoll for the testing of thermonuclear devices, 
which required greater protection from higher levels of destructive energy 
than the lower yield weapons tests at Enewetak. Th e structures ranged in size 
from small instrument enclosures, oft en only a few cubic meters in volume, 
to large, multi-room, multi-story, blockhouses. Construction of the larger 
11  Bob CAMPBELL – Ben DIVEN – John MCDONALD – Bill OGLE – Tom SCOLMAN, “Field 
Testing: Th e Physical Proof of Design Principles.” Los Alamos Science, Winter/Spring, 1983, 
p.  171. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/pubs/00285892.pdf> [cit. 
30. 11. 2016].
12  Blockhouses are oft en referred to colloquially as “bunkers”, although the term bunker is 
more conventionally used to refer to the reinforced underground shelters used in warfare as 
protection against bombs.
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Figure 6: Front (left ) and rear (right) views from 2013 of a reinforced concrete
scientifi c station at the former Soviet nuclear weapons testing site at Semipalatinsk 
in Kazakhstan.
Source: Photo courtesy of Jacob Baynham.
Figure 7: Reinforced concrete blockhouses, such as this former electrical generator 
building on Eneu Island at Bikini Atoll, oft en took numerous forms. Th e two wing
walls extending from the building’s front face allowed for sand to be mounded up 
against and on top of the structure for increased protection from explosive damage
and radiation.
Source: Photo courtesy of Ron Van Oers, UNESCO.
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blockhouses oft en required several months to complete, depending upon the 
complexity of the station’s design. Construction on Station 2300, for example, 
began in September 1953 as a scientifi c station for Operation Castle and was 
completed four months later in January 1954. With three rooms on the fi rst 
fl oor, one room on the second fl oor, and one room on the third, the structure 
was 10-meters wide by 21-meters long and 10-meters high on a one-meter-
thick foundation. Th e exterior wall and roof thicknesses of Station 2300, 
as well as other similar blockhouses, typically varied from 1-meter thick to 
nearly 2-meters in some cases. Th e concrete was reinforced with steel rebar 
(short for reinforcing bar) varying in size from 1 cm to 4 cm in diameter.13
Depending on its size and design, the average cost of a concrete blockhouse 
like that shown in Figure 7 was more than US$125,000 in 1956, which would 
today be more than one million in US dollars.14
Widely used around the world in Cold War military and civilian 
construction, concrete is an amalgamation of Portland cement, hard stone 
aggregate, sand, and water. Although the concrete used for construct-
ing blockhouses at the Nevada Test Site followed this conventional mix, 
the unavailability of hard stone (metamorphic) aggregate and pure water 
required that H&N use crushed coral and seawater in the construction of 
most concrete testing structures in the Pacifi c. For structures such as Station 
2300, the coarse aggregates used for concrete production were mined from 
the Atoll’s seaward reef, where the coral rock was harder.15 Although still 
able to obtain suffi  cient concrete compressive strengths, this coral concrete 
did not provide high levels of gamma radiation shielding. As a result, many 
nuclear testing structures in the Pacifi c incorporated one or more sections 
consisting of limonite concrete.
Th e limonite concrete mixture used at the Pacifi c Proving Grounds 
(PPG) was invented in 1948 by researchers at Princeton University, who 
discovered in their search for a concrete capable of protecting researchers 
working at the university’s cyclotron that a 1-meter-thick wall of concrete 
made of limonite mixed with scrap iron proved to be 280 times more eff ective 
13 Completion Report – Operation Castle 1953–1954. Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, Inc. 1954.
14 Nevada Test Site Guide. United States Department of Energy. DOE/NV-715 Rev. 1. Las Vegas: 
National Nuclear Security Administration 2005, p. 70. Available at: <https://nnsa.energy.gov/
sites/default/fi les/nnsa/inlinefi les/doe%20nv%202001e.pdf> [cit. 5. 12. 2016].
15  D. Lee NARVER, “Good Concrete Made with Coral and Sea Water.” Civil Engineering, 
vol. 24, 1954, no. 10, pp. 40–44.
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in stopping neutrons than ordinary concrete.16 Th eir concrete was a blend of 
Portland cement, seawater, and, in lieu of sand, fi nely ground limonite: an 
amorphous hydrous iron oxide ore. Th e addition of scrap iron, in the form 
of so-called “punchings” ranging from 1 to 2 cm in diameter, as a substitute 
for gravel, completed the concrete mixture. Being more diffi  cult to work 
with and more expensive to make, limonite concrete was used sparingly at 
the PPG and only in components where radiation protection was necessary. 
For example, the front wall of Station 2300 was constructed of limonite 
concrete whereas the other walls, roof, and foundation were made of coral 
concrete.17 In addition to providing direct shock and heat protection, the 
limonite concrete off ered heavy shielding against both the strong radiation 
fi elds created by a nuclear detonation and latent radiation, which would have 
impaired data collection by ionizing gasses in instrument vacuum tubes, 
fogging photographic fi lm in high-speed cameras, and damaging sensitive 
recording instrumentation.
Th e key to the nuclear weapons testing blockhouses’ protective strength 
was as much in their design as in their constituent materials. Designed to 
withstand high blast overpressures, they oft en used angular walls and but-
tresses, thick walls protected by earth berms on one or more sides, and roofs 
covered with meter-thick layers of sand and soil.18 In cases where even brief 
exposure to any of the weapon’s eff ects might have been harmful to person-
nel or instruments, the extreme durability of the blockhouses provided criti-
cal protection. As safe as they were, however, few blockhouses were actually 
occupied by humans during nuclear weapons tests. Although several were 
used as fi ring control points during Pacifi c testing activities, more oft en 
than not, the principal function of a blockhouse was as a scientifi c station for 
instrumentation, oft en functioning as an integral part of the experimental 
setup for blocking or channeling extreme and unwanted thermal, blast, and/
or radiation energies. In this way, blockhouses should be regarded as neces-
sary structures in helping create scientifi c knowledge.
16 Piet C. GUGELOT – Milton G. WHITE, “On the Shielding Qualities of Diff erent Concrete 
Mixtures.” Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 21, 1950, no. 5, pp. 369–379.
17  Although similar in exterior appearance, at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls limonite concrete 
components can be diff erentiated from coral concrete by the remains of a bitumen (tar) coat-
ing that was regularly applied to the surfaces to help forestall corrosion.
18  Rick A. EHLERT, “Coral Concrete at Bikini Atoll.” Concrete International, vol. 13, 1991, 
no. 1, pp. 19–24.
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Discussion: Transformations, Degradations and Disappearance
To no small degree, discussions about trajectories of use, disuse, and disap-
pearance of material culture seem to naturally fall into the domain of archae-
ological theory. Specifi cally, Schiff er and Rathje’s theories on the cultural 
(c-transforms) and non-cultural (n-transforms) transformations of objects 
in systemic and archaeological contexts seem particularly applicable.19 C-
transforms are those human activities, either accidental or intentional, that 
lead to objects (artifacts) being deposited in the archaeological record. In 
this case, the archaeological record is any state of disuse, whether discarded, 
buried, or like the blockhouses of nuclear weapons testing, simply aban-
doned in situ. N-transforms are the physical or environmental processes 
that aff ect the archaeological record in some way. Schiff er’s theories of sys-
temic and archaeological contexts defi ne artifact categories as durables and 
consumables, analogous here to being enduring or ephemeral. In Schiff er’s 
object life cycle model for durable elements he enumerates procurement, 
manufacture, use, and discard as discrete phases of the systemic context 
through which objects pass while en route to an archaeological context.20 It
is these c-transforms and n-transforms that actively and meaningfully aff ect 
the two exemplars discussed in the previous sections.
In the procurement of steel, lattice component manufacturing, trans-
portation, assembly, erection, and use of the towers, Schiff er’s c-transforms 
are particularly evident. Requiring only weeks to be erected, but months 
to be prepared for a test, zero towers would then disappear from the Cold 
War testing landscape in a matter of milliseconds: consumed in a fi reball 
of heat and radiation (as shown in Figure 8), along with the cab, nuclear 
devices and instrumentation they held. With each tower’s destruction be-
ing nearly complete, right down to its concrete foundation, little was left  for 
the archaeological record, except perhaps for some steel stubs in concrete 
foundations. At Enewetak Atoll these remains (including their concrete 
foundations) were later removed in the course of environmental cleanup ef-
forts, providing a defi nitive fi nality to both c-transforms and n-transforms. 
Conversely, at the Nevada Test Site where some tower remains exist (mostly 
steel stubs in concrete foundations), the n-transform processes have not been 
19  Michael B. SCHIFFER – William L. RATHJE, “Effi  cient Exploitation of the Archeological 
Record: Penetrating Problems.” In: REDMAN, C. L. (ed.), Research and Th eory in Current 
Archeology. New York: Wiley-InterScience 1973, p. 171 (169–179).
20  Michael B. SCHIFFER, “Archaeological Context and Systemic Context.” American
Antiquity, vol. 37, 1972, no. 2, pp. 156–165.
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so severely disrupted.21 At Bikini Atoll, towers were used less commonly in
lieu of barges and ground structures and the greater magnitude of the ther-
monuclear detonations created deep craters, which would have completely 
destroyed a tower’s concrete foundations.
Figure 8: Th e development of Rapatronic photographic technologies capable 
of capturing microsecond-length images allowed nuclear weapons scientists 
to capture the burning of a zero tower. Th is Rapatronic photo of the Operation
Tumbler-Snapper detonation in 1952 shows a nuclear fi reball consuming the tower 
roughly 1 millisecond aft er detonation. Estimated to be 20 meters in diameter 
at this point, the fi reball has several spike-shaped protrusions created as it 
consumes the guy wires mooring the tower to the ground.
Source: Photo courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
With the concrete blockhouses used in nuclear weapons testing hav-
ing distinctly diff erent transformative trajectories, they were nonetheless 
subject to c-transforms and n-transforms. Th e concrete types, construction 
practices, and scientifi c use not only defi ned each blockhouse’s function, but 
its form as well. As some of the largest epistemic objects used in nuclear 
weapons testing science, blockhouses played a  critical role in protecting 
21  BECK, “Th e Archaeology of Scientifi c Experiments,” p. 69.
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personnel, scientifi c instrumentation, communications devices, and power 
supplies before, during, and aft er the nuclear detonation. Th ey were also the 
quintessential example of durability in nuclear weapons testing.
Blockhouses were not, however, indestructible. Depending upon
their architecture and proximity to ground zero, the damage sustained by 
a blockhouse as a result of a nuclear test explosion varied, although it was 
frequently negligible. Really severe damage to the concrete structures was 
rare, although degradation in the form of sand scouring to its surfaces from 
blast winds and steel doors warping due to intense heat was not uncommon. 
Station 2300 survived the extreme blast overpressures of several nuclear 
detonations with only minimal damage. Most of the damage to the structure 
came from deactivation and decommissioning activities in 1969, which saw 
the removal of steel doors, exterior ladder rungs, and steel buttresses from 
the structure. Today the most transformational threats to the Station 2300 
and other structures like it are the constant eff ects of weathering and erosion 
caused by climate and vegetation.
At the same time, n-transforms aff ecting Station 2300 are numerous. 
Vegetation, most notably in the form of Scaevola taccada, a  woody shrub 
commonly known as beach naupaka, along with the trees Tournefortia ar-
gentea, Pisonia grandis, and Guettarda speciosa (zebra wood), grow in and
around the blockhouses. Along with Cocos nucifera (coconut palms) their 
roots undermine and crack concrete foundations in a  type of mechanical 
weathering known as root pry. Meanwhile, tropical humidity corrodes rebar 
and spalls, erodes, and crumbles the aging concrete as a form of chemical 
weathering. Unprecedented increases in sea levels, tidal swells, and tropical 
storm severity caused by climate change exacerbates mechanical weathering 
and erosion. Strangely, however, the eff ects of these n-transforms are not 
uniform across all concrete structures at Bikini. Studies of the deteriorated 
Bikini reinforced coral concrete structures conducted in the early 1990s 
indicated that the use of coral aggregates and seawater in the concrete mix, 
once thought deleterious to the strength of the concrete, do not appear to be 
the primary causes of their structural deterioration. Other factors, including 
the amount and nature of atmospheric exposure, thickness of concrete cov-
ering the reinforcing steel, and degree of surface cracking, appeared to be of 
greater eff ect.22 At the same time, the presence of shrubs and trees growing 
22  EHLERT, “Coral Concrete,” p. 23.
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around the Bikini blockhouses seems to provide some protection from the 
weathering eff ects of wind and rain.23
Essentially all nuclear weapons testing objects were and are susceptible 
to c-transforms and n-transforms as they follow their own trajectories of 
transformation and disappearance. Th e rudimentary pressure gauges dis-
covered at the USS Saratoga wreck by Delgado, for example, remain subject 
to constant sand scouring and aqueous corrosion, which will degrade and 
ultimately disintegrate them. Meanwhile, the oscilloscopes, mass spec-
trographs, beta particle spectrographs, photocells, photomultipliers, and 
neutron detectors used in Cold War nuclear weapons testing were reused 
and recycled in science in a process described by Schiff er as “lateral cycling”, 
where the end of an object’s use for one set of activities is followed by re-use 
by another group or individual as the object is re-purposed or re-used.24
Th e objects described here as used for AGEX were oft en re-purposed for
underground nuclear weapons testing.
Conclusion
Th e scie ntifi c experiments of the United States Cold War nuclear testing 
program employed extensive research spaces that produced, used, and 
discarded tens of thousands of scientifi c objects. Among these artifacts are 
two discrete classes of epistemic objects, each showing diff ering patterns 
of use, transformation, and disappearance. Presenting steel towers and 
concrete blockhouses structures as exemplars along a  broader continuum 
of objects that can be identifi ed as either enduring or ephemeral, this paper 
proposed a  functional dichotomy for the wider study and analysis of the 
structures and tools of scientifi c inquiry that comprise the objects of Cold 
War nuclear weapons science. With features and functions that make them 
unique to nuclear weapons testing science, towers and blockhouses of Cold 
War nuclear weapons testing fi t empirically into Schiff er’s object life cycle 
model for durable elements. Starting with each object’s procurement, manu-
facture, use, and disposal, they pass through discrete phases of the systemic 
context en route to an archaeological context, all the while being changed by 
23  Stephen BROWN, Physical Traces of the Nuclear Test History of Bikini Atoll: A Preliminary 
Survey Report. Report to International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and Kili-
Bikini-Ejit Local Government and Historic Preservation Offi  ce, Th e Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, June 2010.
24  SCHIFFER, “Archaeological Context,” p. 159.
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cultural and non-cultural transforms, and with the terminal phase of this 
transformative trajectory being disappearance.
Ultimately, all objects of science disappear as a result of evolution, revo-
lution, or destruction. Th at evolution generally comes as the slow, methodical 
change that occurs as science advances technology and vice versa. Revolu-
tion comes more rapidly, bringing with it new methods and new objects for 
doing science. Destruction, as we have seen with the objects of nuclear weap-
ons testing science, can be sudden or gradual. For the structures of nuclear 
weapons testing science, one might minimally posit that their disappearance 
is substantially reliant upon whether they are ephemeral or enduring in their 
original existence. Ephemeral objects of nuclear testing science disappeared 
quickly as a result of destruction, whereas the fi eld’s more enduring objects 
are likely to disappear as a result of obsolescence and disuse. Disappearance 
can also take multiple forms as was the case where nuclear weapons testing’s 
AGEX metrological technologies fell into obsolescence as the entire nuclear 
testing regime literally moved underground, leaving its most monumental 
concrete objects to crumble to dust.
Although the disappearance of steel towers from the nuclear weapons 
science landscape was instantaneous on a singular event scale, their disap-
pearance in the history of nuclear weapons science as a  whole was more 
gradual. No longer needed aft er nuclear testing began being conducted 
underground, the towers disappeared from American nuclear weapons 
science completely aft er the United States ceased AGEX nuclear weapons 
testing in October 1962, which was amid the political chaos of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis but only peripherally related to the event. With the tower’s 
disappearance from nuclear weapons testing science came an associated 
loss of a  scientifi c research method that had evolved specifi cally and 
substantially over the course its 17-year history, during which the towers 
had served as more than simply platforms upon which to stage physics ex-
periments; they were part of a grand scientifi c method of nuclear weapons 
testing aimed at understanding the complex physics and physical eff ects 
of nuclear explosions. No longer needed to sustain the state of the science, 
their disappearance as a  scientifi c method is plausibly permanent, as in 
no sound and responsible nuclear weapons testing science protocol are 
humans ever again likely to see nuclear bombs detonated on steel towers 
while instruments record data in massive concrete blockhouses. In fact, 
by the end of America’s AGEX testing era, airplanes had replaced block-
houses as methods for photographing and recording nuclear detonation 
data.
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Although this paper considers only the disappearance of scientifi c ob-
jects in a specifi c twentieth-century scientifi c space, the implications of the 
ephemeral/enduring duality are potentially more timeless. Th e trajectories 
by which all objects of science disappear from the scientifi c landscape are 
important patterns for social studies of science and the archaeological study 
of science. Because the epistemic objects of science neither spontaneously 
appear nor disappear from the scientifi c landscape, the manner and means 
of their appearance and disappearance is crucial to understanding better 
the complex historical and contemporary practices of scientifi c inquiry and 
discovery.
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